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Abstract
This paper proposes a monopolistic competition model in which firms facing demand
uncertainty use both permanent and temporary workers to evade the labor adjustment
costs associated with permanent workers, and explores links between the demand for
temporary and permanent workers and economic globalization. The model highlights
intensified product market competition as a driving force behind the shift in demand
from permanent to temporary workers. In addition, our model shows that international
outsourcing effectively reduces labor adjustment costs, which decreases the demand
for permanent workers. We empirically test these links using industry-level data from
the Japanese manufacturing sector. We find a positive correlation between foreign out-
sourcing and the replacement of permanent workers with temporary workers in domestic
production. Additionally, we find that industries losing their global share of value-added
tend to decrease their employment of permanent workers and increase the proportions
of temporary workers.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in the number of temporary workers in
the Japanese manufacturing sector. During 2001–2006, the total manufacturing workforce
decreased by 0.6 million, with 1 million permanent workers lost and 0.4 million temporary
positions created: thus, about 40% of permanent work has been replaced with temporary
work.1 This trend of a substantial shift from permanent workers to temporary workers has
already resulted in a broad range of debates on employment stability, income inequality, and
human capital accumulation in the Japanese political arena, and the relaxing of regulations
on temporary workers in the 2000s has been postulated as an important reason for the rise
of temporary workers in Japan.2
Nevertheless, economic globalization, such as trade and foreign outsourcing, may also
play a role in the rapid increase in temporary work by downplaying national borders and
thereby encouraging firms to reconsider labor contracts with their employees. In particular,
in countries with strong labor protections and rigid labor markets, such as European coun-
tries and Japan, as a result of facing intensified international competition, firms might have
experienced more pressure from substantial labor adjustment costs. As anecdotal evidence,
Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), Japan’s largest lobbying group, claimed that la-
bor market flexibility and more aggressive use of temporary workers were vital because of
increasing market uncertainty and sales volatility caused by incrementally tougher global
competition.3
This paper investigates whether international trade encourages manufacturers to be
more aggressive in their employment of temporary workers rather than permanent workers.
It is important to examine the effects of economic globalization on labor contracts, because a
firm’s choice of labor contracts potentially influences workers’ welfare through their rewards
and job security, yet the choice has rarely been investigated as a source of the distributional
effects of trade. The motivation of this paper is best described in Figure 1, which presents
the ratios of temporary workers to total employment in Japanese manufacturing firms. In
1999, the ratio of temporary workers tends to decline as the size of establishments increases.
1These figures are the authors’ calculation using the Census of Establishment and Firms.
2The Worker Dispatching Act, enacted in 2004, allowed the manufacturing sector to use temporary
workers dispatched from private agencies. This deregulation might be responsible for manufacturers’ more
aggressive use of temporary workers.
3Their report (in Japanese) is available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/041/index.html
as of October 2015.
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However, this pattern is less clear in 2006, implying that larger establishments increased
their numbers of temporary workers more aggressively. The recent heterogeneous firm trade
literature has established that firms engaged in international activities, such as exporting,
are superior to non-internationalized firms in many respects, including size and productivity.
Thus, the pattern observed in Figure 1 leads to the conjecture that the internationalization
of firms may raise firms’ relative demand for temporary workers.
To examine the validity of this conjecture, we extend the monopolistic competition
model developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) by incorporating the dual-labor
market structure proposed by Saint-Paul (1996), who studied the coexistence of workers
with long-term contracts associated with firing costs (permanent workers) and those with
short fixed-duration contracts (temporary workers) within the same firm. Endogenous elas-
ticities of substitution enable us to examine the effects of product market competition on
firms’ optimal choice of the employment of permanent and temporary workers. Indeed, the
endogenous feature of elasticities of substitution proves crucial for reproducing the size-
decreasing trend of the relative demand for temporary and permanent workers in Figure
1. The key mechanism is as follows. When there are firm-specific output fluctuations due
to taste shocks, firms may employ both permanent and temporary workers to reduce the
labor adjustment costs, even though temporary workers are less productive than permanent
workers. In such a framework, intensified product market competition makes the product
demand more elastic and magnifies the impact of output fluctuations caused by firm-specific
demand shocks on firms’ labor demand. As a result, firms increase their demand for tempo-
rary workers relative to permanent workers. Thus, our model elucidates the linkage between
product market competition and the relative demand for temporary and permanent work-
ers. Furthermore, because the product demand for productive firms is always less elastic
than for unproductive firms, productive firms have a lower demand for temporary workers.
Placing our model in a two-country open economy with trade costs leads to more nuanced
predictions on firms’ demands for temporary and permanent workers, but product market
competition continues to play a key role. If trade openness occurs in the form of mutual
trade cost reductions between the two countries, intensified product market competition
will raise the relative demand for temporary workers for all firms. However, for exporting
firms, the productivity gain due to the trade cost reduction will reduce the demand for
temporary workers by making export demand less elastic. Thus, whereas the total effect for
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exporting firms is unclear, non-exporting firms will always increase their relative demand
for temporary workers.
In contrast, if trade openness occurs in the form of an foreign market expansion (e.g.,
emerging economies join international market competition), only exporting firms will in-
crease their demand for temporary workers relative to permanent workers. Non-exporting
firms will not change the relative demand for temporary workers because the exit of the
least productive firms cancels the effect of increasing import competition in the domestic
market. Thus, our model predicts that this form of trade openness encourages exporting
(and larger) firms to increase their relative demand for temporary workers while not chang-
ing that of non-exporting (and smaller) firms, which is largely consistent with the pattern
observed in Figure 1.
We also examine the effects of foreign outsourcing—replacing home production with
imported intermediate goods.4 Our model highlights the market competition effect of out-
sourcing: outsourcing reduces firms’ production costs and increases the profitability, which
invites new entrant firms to enter the product market which consequently becomes more
competitive. Thus, outsourcing also has an upward effect on the relative demand for tem-
porary workers.
Interestingly, the model identifies two additional effects of outsourcing on the demand
for temporary and permanent workers. It is well known that the effect of outsourcing on
a firm’s total employment is in general ambiguous because labor in outsourced tasks is
replaced by imported intermediate goods (job relocation by substitution) while the cost
reduction by outsourcing increases the labor demand for the remaining tasks (job creation
by cost reduction).5 Our model suggests that, whereas the substitution effect of outsourcing
is neutral for the firms’ relative demand for temporary workers, the cost reduction effect of
outsourcing is more powerful for temporary workers than permanent workers. As a result,
the cost reduction effect tends to raise the ratio of temporary workers. Another effect is
that outsourcing mitigates the employment distortion for permanent workers. Due to the
adjustment cost, firms retain too many permanent workers, compared to the level that
would be chosen if there were no firing costs. Intuitively, outsourcing reduces the labor
share in the production cost, which lowers the burden of the labor adjustment cost and,
4In this respect, vertical FDI is essentially the same as foreign outsourcing. Thus, the model’s predictions
about outsourcing are applicable to vertical FDI.
5See, for example, Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) for detailed discussions about the
various effects of foreign outsourcing on firms’ employment.
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as a result, firms decrease the number of permanent workers engaged in home production.
This distortion mitigation effect also increases the relative demand for temporary workers.
We explore the empirical relevance of the model’s theoretical predictions. Constructing a
panel dataset of Japanese manufacturing sectors from various sources, we find evidence that
economic globalization is associated with the shift from permanent to temporary workers.
Our main empirical findings are twofold. First, industries losing world share of output tend
to increase the ratio of temporary workers. Second, industries more reliant on outsourcing
tend to decrease their employment of permanent workers, thereby increasing the ratio of
temporary workers. In summary, our empirical findings are largely consistent with the
model’s predictions.
[Related Literature] Our paper contributes to the literature of labor market flexibility.
Saint-Paul (1996) produced an early comprehensive study of the dual labor market in which
both permanent and temporary workers coexist. Wasmer (1999) theoretically examined the
effects of business cycles on the demand for temporary and permanent workers. However, the
analysis in these studies largely remains within the macroeconomic framework, and does not
deal with product market competition. A permanent-to-temporary shift in the labor force is
not a phenomenon exclusive to Japan, and there is a rich body of literature that contributes
to the study of temporary labor markets in Europe. Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno
(2002) reviewed the Spanish experience of the aggressive use of temporary employment
contracts since the mid-1980s. Blanchard and Landier (2002) found that temporary workers
in France who stay in entry-level jobs longer were not likely to obtain permanent jobs.
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) observed that adverse Swedish macroeconomic conditions in
the 1990s made firms more prone to offer temporary jobs and workers more willing to accept
such offers. More recent studies based on the framework proposed by these studies include
Costain, Jimeno, and Carlos (2010), Ono, Qinghua, and Jin (2010), and Aguirregabiria
and Alonso-Borrego (2014). None of these papers examines the linkage between product
market competition and firms’ demand for temporary workers. Our study explores how
economic globalization could affect firms’ demand for temporary and permanent workers,
and in particular, theoretically highlights the role of production market competition.
The relationship between trade and employment has been intensively examined in em-
pirical trade research. For example, Slaughter (2001) found that trade-related variables had
a mixed effect on increasing labor-demand elasticities. Tomiura (2003) found that import
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competition intensity reduced employment in recessionary periods when the yen appreci-
ated. In addition, Tomiura (2004) showed that import competition also has a significant
effect on job creation and loss through plant startups and shutdowns. Using the assumption
that intense import competition causes firms and industries to switch away from implicit
contracts, Bertrand (2004) found that the sensitivity of wages to the current unemployment
rate should increase when import competition increases. More recently, Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson (2013) examined the effects of Chinese import competition on US labor-market
outcomes. None of these studies examined the dual labor market.
There is a growing body of studies that consider labor market frictions in open economy
settings. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), and
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) are recent studies. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch,
and Xiang (2014) investigated the wage-effect of offshoring, using Danish employer-employee
matched data. Lommerud, Meland, and Straume (2009) studied the effects of a unionized
labor force and foreign outsourcing. Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) exam-
ined various effects of foreign outsourcing on heterogeneous firms’ employment. However,
none of these consider workers in terms of employment flexibility. Our paper considers the
effects of trade openness on the demand for two types of workers, permanent and temporary,
that are different in terms of both rewards and job stability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a theoretical model
in a closed economy setting to highlight the role of product market competition. Section
3 extends the model to open economy settings and examines the impact of globalization
on the demand for temporary and permanent workers. Section 4 presents our empirical
methodology and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Base Model
This section proposes a dual labor market model in which permanent and temporary jobs
coexist within the same firm, following Saint-Paul (1996, chapters 6 and 7). To examine
the effects of market competition on the demand for good and bad jobs, we extend the
Saint-Paul model by placing it in a monopolistically competitive environment proposed by
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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2.1 Demand
Consider an economy populated with L households that consume a homogenous good and
differentiated goods. The representative consumer maximizes the following quasi-linear
utility function based on Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008):
U = qc0 + α
∫ N
0
qcidi−
ζ
2
∫ N
0
[qci ]
2di−
η
2
[∫ N
0
qcidi
]2
, (1)
where qc0 and q
c
i denote individual consumption of the homogeneous good and each variety
i of the differentiated goods, respectively. N is a measure of the consumed varieties of
differentiated goods. Parameters α, ζ, and η are nonnegative. Parameters α and η denote
a consumer’s maximum willingness-to-pay for the differentiated goods: increases in α and
decreases in η shift demand from the homogeneous good to the differentiated goods. Pa-
rameter ζ indexes the degree of product differentiation between the varieties: when ζ = 0,
the varieties are perfect substitutes.
We introduce demand uncertainty for the differentiated goods. It is assumed that pa-
rameter α is composed of a constant part (α¯) and a stochastic part (αs) so that α = α¯+αs.
While α¯ is common across all varieties of the differentiated goods, αs is independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across varieties. Specifically, αs follows a two-state Markov
process in which each variety is either in the high state (αH > 0) or the low state (αL < 0),
and the probability of transition from αL to αH is given by β and that of the reverse transi-
tion is given by γ. For simplicity, we impose the parameter restriction that βαH + γαL = 0
to ensure that the mean value of α across varieties is α¯.6
As usual, the utility maximization for (1) generates the demand for each variety i for
the individual consumer as follows:
qci =
1
ζ
[α− ηQc − pi] , (2)
where Qc =
∫ N
0 q
c
idi. By summing equation (2) over all varieties, we obtain the expression
for Qc. Note that Qc is not stochastic due to the parameter restriction on αs for s = {H,L}
and the transition probabilities. Substituting the expression for Qc into equation (2) and
6We are implicitly considering a continuous time model in which infinitely long-lived households optimize
their consumption flows over a time horizon. Thus, equation (1) should be regarded as the instantaneous
utility function. However, our specification of utility function is quasi-linear, and, thus, all income effects are
absorbed by the consumption of the homogenous good, which allows us to disregard the dynamic optimization
of consumption flows.
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the summing over all households, we obtain the (inverse) market demand for variety i such
that
pi =
ηNp¯ + α¯ζ
ηN + ζ
+ αs −
ζ
L
qi, s = {H,L}, (3)
where p¯ = (1/N)
∫ N
0 pidi represents the average price of the differentiated goods. The linear
demand in equation (3) indicates that the upper boundary price, beyond which demand for
variety i goes to zero, has two states depending on the realization of αj with mean value
z¯ ≡ (ηNp¯ + α¯ζ)/(ηN + ζ).
For notational brevity, we will hereafter drop the subscript i and express the inverse
demand function in (3) by
p = zs −
b
2
q, s = {H,L}, (4)
where b ≡ 2ζ/L and zs ≡ z¯ + αs. The price elasticity of demand in state s is given by
ǫs = |(∂q/∂p)(p/q)| = [(z¯ +αs)/p− 1]
−1. An increase in the number of competing varieties
N or a reduction in average prices p¯ lowers z¯, leading to an increase in ǫs for any given
price p, that is, a “tougher” competitive environment.
2.2 Production
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor that is a single production input
in our model. Workers are freely mobile between the homogenous good and differentiated
goods sectors. The homogenous good is perfectly competitive and serves as the numeraire
good in the model. Assuming that the households possess sufficient income to consume the
homogenous goods, the competitive wage rate is determined by labor productivity in the
homogenous goods.
As for the production of differentiated goods, we assume that each firm may have dif-
ferent productivities and produces its own variety of differentiated goods. Each variety of
the differentiated goods is produced by a linear production technology such that y = l/ϕ
where l represents labor input in units of temporary workers and ϕ represents the unit labor
requirement (productivity). Following Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the
unit labor requirement is time-invariant and randomly assigned from a commonly known
distribution G(ϕ) with support on [0, ϕm] upon market entry. When drawing sufficiently low
productivities (high unit labor requirements), firms will immediately exit from the market.
Otherwise, firms stay in the market and generate revenues of zsl/ϕ− b(l/ϕ)
2/2. Because ϕ
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is firm-specific and each firm specializes in its own variety of differentiated goods, we will
hereafter use ϕ as an index of firms and differentiated goods.
It is assumed that there are two types of labor contract—long-term and fixed-duration
contracts—in the differentiated good sector. Long-term contracts do not specify any pre-
determined duration so we will refer to these workers as “permanent workers.” Although
long-term contracts are open-ended, firms can terminate those at any time period by pay-
ing a linear firing cost δ measured in units of the homogenous good. In contrast, firms can
freely create and destroy fixed-duration contracts at any time. Workers employed on these
contracts will be referred to as “temporary workers.”
We assume that although workers are perfectly substitutable for each other regardless
of their contract type, permanent workers are λ > 1 times more productive than temporary
workers. When a firm employs l1 units of permanent workers and l2 units of temporary
workers, its labor input is given by l = λl1 + l2 in units of temporary workers.
The assumption of perfect substitutability between the two types of worker crystalizes
a key determinant of firms’ demand for temporary workers relative to permanent workers—
the degree of product market competition. The productivity superiority of permanent
workers over temporary workers can be justified as follows. The employment of permanent
workers is less volatile than that of temporary workers. Thus, firms may use this job
security as a device to induce workers to expend effort to acquire firm-specific skills, resulting
in the efficiency advantage of permanent workers over temporary workers. The tradeoff
between the efficiency advantage and the adjustment-cost disadvantage enables permanent
and temporary workers to coexist within the same firm.7
2.3 Employment Policy
We now characterize firms’ employment policies. To begin, we note that when firms use
both permanent and temporary workers, the wage for permanent workers, w1, has to be
lower than the effective wage for temporary workers, λw2. Otherwise, firms will never use
permanent workers. Furthermore, λw2 must be lower than the sum of w1 and the expected
7If temporary jobs are potential “stepping stones” to permanent employment, workers on temporary con-
tracts might be motivated acquire such skills (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). However, Booth, Francesconi,
and Frank (2002) empirically showed that even though there was some evidence that temporary jobs are
stepping stones to permanent jobs, temporary workers still faced lower probabilities of receiving work-related
training and tended to be poorly paid even after moving to permanent jobs (especially among male tempo-
rary workers). It is also difficult for temporary workers to convert their labor contracts to permanent ones
in Japan (Shikata, 2012).
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firing cost of a permanent worker, γδ.8 Otherwise, firms will never use temporary workers.
Given that w1 < λw2 < w1 + γδ holds, a firm’s employment policy is as follows. (i) A
firm in the low state uses only permanent workers. This is because no dismissals occur in
the low state and permanent workers are less expensive than temporary workers without
the firing cost. (ii) When the state switches from the low to the high state, the firm will
hire only temporary workers to fill the increasing labor demand. (iii) When the demand
switches from the high to the low state, the firm will dismiss all the temporary workers and
never dismiss the permanent workers. Although this employment policy is highly stylized,
we emphasize that it still captures an important characteristic of temporary workers—a
buffer to demand fluctuations.
To support this employment policy, the labor cost condition of w1 < λw2 < w1 + γδ
is necessary. The wage determination is as follows. Assuming flexible labor movement
between the homogeneous and differentiated goods sectors, the wage rate for temporary
workers is determined to be the competitive wage, which is denoted by w2. We assume
that firms apply efficiency wages a` la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to permanent workers to
induce productivity supremacy λ. In the Appendix, we show that w1 is pinned down at the
competitive wage w2 plus a wage premium depending on a set of exogenous parameters and
that w1 is state-independent under the aforementioned employment policy, which provides
reasonable grounds for the condition of w1 < λw2 < w1 + γδ. It should be noted that this
wage determination not only greatly simplifies the analysis but also highlight the effects
of product market competition on the demand for temporary and permanent workers by
eliminating the effects of wage changes.
With the firms’ employment policy and wages in hand, we may now derive the employ-
ment levels of permanent and temporary workers.9 The expected return from investing in
a firm—composed of the instantaneous profits and the expected capital gains from state
switching—must equal the return on an equal size investment in a safe asset. Hence, de-
8Dismissals occur when the state switches from high to low. Thus, given that firms dismiss permanent
workers, the expected firing cost is γδ.
9We note that this is not the only employment policy that allows the co-existence of permanent and
temporary workers within the same firm. Suppose that w1 + γδ ≤ λw2 holds in the low state. Then, as
Saint-Paul (1996) showed, firms hit by a good shock may increase permanent jobs. However, this employment
policy reduces job security for permanent workers because some permanent workers will be dismissed when
the state switches to the low one. To induce permanent workers’ effort, firms need to raise w1. As firms
increase permanent jobs in the high state, w1 continues to rise because permanent jobs become less secured
and once w1+ γδ reaches λw2, then, firms will switch to hiring temporary workers. This employment policy
may be more realistic than the one in the main text, but does note yield additional insights about the relative
demand for temporary workers. Thus, we focus on the simpler employment policy.
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noting the value of a firm in state s = {H,L} by Vs, we have the following two asset
equations.
ρVH(l1, l2, ϕ) = πH(l1, l2, ϕ) + γ [VL(l1, l2, ϕ)− VH(l1, l2, ϕ)] , (5)
and
ρVL(l1, l2, ϕ) = πL(l1, ϕ) + β [VH(l1, l2, ϕ)− VL(l1, l2, ϕ)] , (6)
where ρ is the return rate of the safe asset and πs are the instantaneous profits given by
πH(l1, l2, ϕ) =
zH(λl1 + l2)
ϕ
−
b(λl1 + l2)
2
2ϕ2
− w1l1 − w2l2,
πL(l1, ϕ) =
zLλl1
ϕ
−
b(λl1)
2
2ϕ2
− w1l1.
Rearranging the asset equations in (5) and (6), we obtain
VH(l1, l2, ϕ) =
πH(l1, l2, ϕ) + γVL(l1, ϕ)
ρ+ γ
, (7)
and
VL(l1, ϕ) =
πL(l1, ϕ) + βVH(l1, l2, ϕ)
ρ+ β
, (8)
where argument l2 is omitted from VL because firms use temporary workers only in the high
state without incurring any adjustment costs.
Note that firms use temporary workers to fill the infra-marginal labor demand in the
high state. Thus, firms in the high state optimize the total employment level by adjusting
l2. In equation (7), the first-order condition (FOC) with respect to l2 leads to the optimized
total employment (in units of temporary workers) in the high state:
λl1 + l2 =
ϕ
b
(zH − ϕw2). (9)
Firms employ permanent workers to the extent that the marginal cost of permanent workers
is equalized to that of temporary workers. Plugging equation (9) into the FOC of equation
(7) with respect to l1 provides the following condition.
w2 = ω1 −
γV ′L(l1, ϕ)
λ
, (10)
where ω1 ≡ w1/λ is the effective wage of permanent workers.
Equation (10) implies that the marginal cost for temporary workers, w2, must equal
the effective wage for permanent workers, ω1, plus the marginal expected loss in the low
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state, −γV ′L(l1, ϕ)/λ. Intuitively, as w2 > ω1, the firm employs permanent workers up to
the point where an efficiency loss of V ′L(l1, ϕ) < 0 occurs in the low state. We obtain the
expression of V ′L by differentiating equation (8) with respect to l1:
V ′L(l1, ϕ) =
1
ρ+ β
[
λ
ϕ
(
zL −
bλl1
ϕ
)
− w1
]
, (11)
Note that setting V ′L(l1, ϕ) equal to 0 implies that zL/ϕ − bλl1/ϕ
2 = ω1, which is the
condition for maximizing the instantaneous profits in the low state. Thus, V ′L(l1, ϕ) < 0
indicates that firms retain too many permanent workers, compared to the level that firms
would choose in the low state without the firing cost. It should be noted that the over-
employment of permanent workers in the low state occurs due to the firing cost and the
usage of temporary workers partially eliminates the efficiency loss (see the Appendix).
Plugging (11) into (10) leads to the employment of permanent workers in units of tem-
porary workers:
λl1 =
ϕ
b
[zL − ϕ (ω1 − d)] , where d ≡
(ρ+ β) (w2 − ω1)
γ
. (12)
The term d in equation (12) is interpreted as an index of the distortion in the employment of
permanent workers. We note that non-negative employment of temporary workers by firms
in operation requires zH/w2 > zL/(ω1 − d) and we assume that this normality condition
always holds in what follows.
Figure 2 illustrates the employment determination of permanent and temporary workers.
The marginal cost of temporary workers is expressed by a horizontal line at w2, while the
(true) marginal cost of permanent workers, ω1 − γV
′
L(l)/λ, is an upward-sloping schedule.
Equation (10) is represented at point A—the employment of permanent workers in the low
state. When zH is realized, then the total employment level will be at point B where a
downward marginal revenue schedule ϕ−1(zH − bl/ϕ) intersects the marginal cost line w2.
As all employment fluctuations are absorbed by temporary workers, the model suggests
that whereas the employment of temporary workers is positively correlated with output,
the employment of permanent workers is insensitive to output fluctuations. In the empirical
section, we will test this prediction.
Another important role of temporary workers is to reduce employment inefficiency due
to the firing cost associated with permanent workers. The following two extreme cases
highlight this point. First, suppose that temporary workers are so unproductive that firms
are indifferent between filling the infra-marginal employment in the high state by permanent
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or temporary workers, namely, w2 = ω1 + γδ/λ. In Figure 2, point A
′ represents the
employment of permanent workers in the low state and point B′ the total employment in the
high state. The employment of permanent workers satisfies −V ′L(l1) = δ, which implies that
firms set the marginal benefit of firing additional permanent workers equal to the marginal
cost of firing δ. The over-employment of permanent workers in the low state is maximized
in this case. Second, by contrast, suppose that w2 = ω1: temporary workers are equally
as productive as permanent workers. Then, firms would employ only temporary workers in
both states and the employment in the low state is at point A′′ satisfying V ′L = 0 while the
employment in the high state is represented by point B′′. These two cases illustrate that
the introduction of temporary workers under the condition w1 < λw2 < w1 + γδ partially
mitigates the distortion in the employment of permanent workers.
Using equations (9) and (12), the ratio of temporary workers to total employment—an
index for a firm’s relative demand for temporary workers—is given by
RTW (ϕ, z¯) ≡
l2
λ11 + l2
= 1−
z¯ + αL − ϕ (ω1 − d)
z¯ + αH − ϕw2
, (13)
where zs = z¯ + αs is used. Equation (13) reveals that decreases in the mean of the upper
bound price, z¯, will raise the proportion of temporary workers. Because decreases in z¯ make
the product demand more elastic for any given price, a “tougher” competitive environment
increases the relative demand for temporary workers. Intuitively, the effect of demand
fluctuations is pronounced under more elastic demand. Consequently, firms increase the
relative demand for temporary workers as z¯ decreases. This observation is particularly
important for examining the effects of globalization on the demand for permanent and
temporary workers. Hence, we record it as the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Holding other things constant, if market competition is intensified and
the product demand becomes more elastic, then, each firm will increase the proportion of
temporary workers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the linear demand in equation (3), the price elasticity of demand ǫs monotonically
increases with product price along the demand curve. Productive firms with higher output
have lower price elasticities of demand, compared to less productive firms with lower output.
Hence, the linkage between the price elasticity of demand and the ratio of temporary workers
implies that more productive firms have lower proportions of temporary workers, which is
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largely consistent with the cross-plant differences in relative demand for temporary workers
in Figure 1.
Proposition 2. Productive firms tend to have lower proportions of temporary workers than
unproductive firms.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It should be noted that the model’s predictions in Propositions 1 and 2 hold for a class
of demand functions that are less convex than the iso-elastic demand. Thus, our results
are quite general. For example, the mechanism highlighted by our model works in the
monopolistic trade model pioneered by Krugman (1979) that stressed trade gains from more
varieties of differentiated goods and lower markups charged by firms. The standard constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences insulate the relative demand for temporary
workers from the effects of product market competition and firm heterogeneity and, as a
result, all firms will have a common proportion of temporary workers, which contradicts
with Figure 1 (See the Appendix for the detail).
2.4 Free Entry
As the demand shock is i.i.d., a fraction h ≡ β/(β + γ) of all operating firms is in the high
state, while a fraction of 1−h ≡ γ/(β+γ) is in the low state. From equations (9) and (12),
the threshold productivities above which the output is driven to 0 are given by
ϕH(z¯) =
zH
w2
and ϕL(z¯) =
zL
ω1 − d
. (14)
By the normality condition, ϕL < ϕH holds.
10
Firms’ flow profits follow those of standard monopolistic competition with linear demand
except for the modifications due to labor adjustment. Using an indicator variable I(ϕ) that
takes 1 for ϕ ∈ [0, ϕL) and 0 for ϕ ∈ [ϕL, ϕH ], firms’ flow profits in the high state are given
by
πH(z¯, ϕ) =
L
4ζ
[z¯ + αH − ϕw2]
2 + I(ϕ) · ϕ (w2 − ω1) qL(ϕ), (15)
where
qL(ϕ) =
L
2ζ
[z¯ + αL − ϕ(ω1 − d)]
10Firms in the range of [ϕL, ϕH ] employ only temporary workers in the high state and no workers in the
low state.
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represents the optimal output in the low state. The second term in πH presents the pro-
ductivity advantage of permanent workers over temporary workers. The flow profits in the
low state are given by
πL(z¯, ϕ) =
L
4ζ
[
(z¯ + αL − ϕω1)
2 − (ϕd)2
]
, (16)
where the second term in the squared brackets is the profit loss stemming from employing
too many permanent workers.
The average upper bound price z¯ is the sole unknown variable in the model. We assume
that firms incur a fixed investment fe in units of the numeraire goods prior to entry. Free
entry ensures that the expected firm value equals fe in equilibrium. Equations (7) and (8)
give firm values Vs with respect to the flow profits πs. Denoting the average firm profits
prior to entry by π¯s(z¯) ≡
∫ ϕs(z¯)
0 πs(ϕ)dG(ϕ), the free entry condition can be expressed by
hπ¯H(z¯) + (1− h)π¯L(z¯) = ρfe, (17)
which gives z¯ in equilibrium. Once z¯ is determined, the two threshold productivities in
equation (14) pin down the distribution of firms in operation. The average product prices
in each state are given by p¯s = [
∫ ϕs
0 ps(ϕ)dG(ϕ)]/G(ϕs) for s = {H,L}, which in turn
gives the mass of firms N = (ζ/η) · (α¯ − z¯)/(z¯ − p¯) where the average price p¯ is given by
p¯ = hp¯H + (1− h)p¯L.
Holding other things constant, the average profits π¯s increase as z¯ increases. Thus, the
comparative statics with respect to the economy size(L), the degree of product differen-
tiation (ζ), and the production technology in the differentiated goods (ϕm) generates the
following results.
Proposition 3. If the economy size increases (L ↑), the differentiated goods become more
substitutable with each other (ζ ↓), or the productivity of the differentiated goods sector
improves (ϕm ↓), then each firm will increase the relative demand for temporary workers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, larger markets, more substitutability between varieties of the differentiated
goods, or improved productivity of the differentiated goods raise the average profits prior
to entry and induce new entrants, which lowers the average upper bound price and the
survival probability G(ϕH ). In such a competitive market environment, firms facing more
elastic product demand increase their relative demand for temporary workers.
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Productive firms tend to have lower relative demand for temporary workers (Proposition
2). Thus, when z¯ declines (and ϕs also declines), each surviving firm increases the relative
demand for temporary workers while the selection effect reduces the sectoral average of
the relative demand for temporary workers. To see which effect is dominant on the rela-
tive demand for temporary workers at the sector level, we parameterize the productivity
distribution as a standard Pareto distribution:
G(ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕm
)k
, ϕ ∈ [0, ϕm], (18)
where k > 0 is the shape parameter.11 As is well known, the Pareto distribution is unaltered
by any truncation of ϕ from above. State switches occur randomly at the firm level. Thus,
the distribution of firms in each state also follows a Pareto distribution such that Gs(ϕ) =
(ϕ/ϕs)
k.
Because the average productivity of surviving firms in state s is given by
ϕ˜s(z¯) =
1
G(ϕs(z¯))
∫ ϕs(z¯)
0
ϕdG(ϕ) =
k
k + 1
ϕs(z¯),
the average output in each state is
q˜j(z¯) =
(z¯ + αj)L
2ζ(k + 1)
, for j = {H,L} (19)
Hence, the sector average of the proportion of temporary workers is given by
R˜WT (z¯) = 1−
ϕ˜Lq˜LG(ϕL)
ϕ˜H q˜HG(ϕH )
= 1−
(
w2
ω1 − d
)k+1( z¯ + αL
z¯ + αH
)k+2
, (20)
which is unambiguously decreasing in z¯.12 Thus, we conclude that Proposition 3 holds at the
sector level when firm productivity follows the standard Pareto distribution. To facilitate
analysis, we continue to use the Pareto distribution in equation (18) in what follows.
3 Open Economy
The purpose of the extension is to examine how international trade would affect firms’
relative demand for temporary workers. Following the convention of the literature, we start
our analysis with trade in final goods. Then, on the grounds that the recent trade literature
has emphasized the role of international production fragmentation in trade, we will further
extend our base model by incorporating foreign outsourcing.
11As k increases, the dispersion of firm productivity decreases. As an extreme, when k goes to infinity, all
firms’ unit labor requirements become degenerated with value ϕm.
12The characteristics of the average of operating firms performance measures are qualitatively similar to
those in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). See the Appendix for details.
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3.1 The Effects of Trade in Final Goods
We consider an open economy composed of two countries, a home country and a foreign
country (denoted by *), that have the same preferences and production technology as de-
scribed in the base model. For analytical simplicity, we also assume that the two countries
have the same labor market structure in which both permanent and temporary workers
may coexist within the same firm.13 However, we allow for a cross-country difference in
economy size (L 6= L∗).
The trade environment between the countries is standard: while the numeraire goods are
freely traded, the differentiated goods are associated with iceberg-type trade costs: home
firms have to ship τ∗ > 1 units when supplying one unit of their products abroad, while
there is no such trade costs for local supply. Similarly, foreign firms have to incur the trade
cost τ > 1 for exports to the home country. Labor is internationally immobile, but freely
mobile across the sectors.
Firms in the differentiated good sector can sell their products in both markets regardless
of their location. Because the two markets are segmented and production has constant
returns to scale, firms separately determine the outputs for domestic supply and exports.
A home firm with productivity ϕ exports qXs in state s = {H,L} where
qXH(ϕ) =
L∗
2ζ
[z∗H − τ
∗ϕw2] , qXL(ϕ) ≡
L∗
2ζ
[z∗L − τ
∗ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (21)
which implies the following firm sorting: firms with ϕ ≤ ϕXL = z
∗
L[τ
∗ω1 − d)]
−1 choose to
export regardless of the state, and those with ϕXL < ϕ ≤ ϕXH = z¯
∗
H(τ
∗w2)
−1 choose to
export only when the state is high. The remaining firms do not export.
Letting I(ϕ) be an indicator variable that takes 1 for ϕ ∈ [0, ϕXL) and 0 for ϕ ∈
[ϕXL, ϕXH ], the export profits in the high and low states are given by
πXH(ϕ) =
L∗
4ζ
[z∗H − τ
∗ϕw2]
2 + I(ϕ) · τ∗ϕ (w2 − ω1) qXL(ϕ), (22)
and
πXL(ϕ) =
L∗
4ζ
[
(z∗L − τ
∗ϕω1)
2 − (τ∗ϕd)2
]
. (23)
13In reality, countries may differ in labor adjustment costs. However, the assumption of the identical
labor market structure greatly helps to maintain the model’s tractability without qualitatively affecting the
insights from the model. Indeed, if we assume that the foreign country can freely adjust permanent workers,
the model’s important predictions about the demand for permanent and temporary workers in the home
country are unaltered.
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As in the closed economy in the previous section, the free-entry condition equalizes the
expected profits (prior to entry) to the entry cost in each country:
h [π¯H(z¯) + π¯XH(z¯
∗)] + (1− h) [π¯L(z¯) + π¯XL(z¯
∗)] = ρfe, (24)
h [π¯∗H(z¯
∗) + π¯∗XH(z¯)] + (1− h) [π¯
∗
L(z¯
∗) + π¯∗XL(z¯)] = ρfe, (25)
where π¯Xs ≡
∫ ϕXs(z¯∗)
0 πXs(ϕ)dG(ϕ) for s = {H,L} and those with asterisk are the foreign
counterparts. Note that as foreign firms’ threshold productivity for domestic supply are
given by ϕ∗H = z¯
∗
H/w2 and ϕ
∗
L = z¯
∗/(ω1 − d), home firms’ threshold productivity for
export is given by ϕXs = ϕ
∗
s/τ
∗. Therefore, home firms’ expected profits from export can
be expressed in terms of foreign firms’ expected profits earned from the domestic market.
In particular, by using the Pareto distribution in equation (18), it can be shown that
π¯Xs(z¯
∗) = [τ∗]−kπ¯∗s(z¯
∗). The analogous equations hold for foreign firms’ exports. Thus, we
can rewrite the free entry conditions in equations (24) and (25) using firms’ average profits
earned from their domestic markets:
Π(z¯) + (τ∗)−kΠ∗(z¯∗) = ρfe, (26)
τ−kΠ(z¯) + Π∗(z¯∗) = ρfe, (27)
where Π(z¯) ≡ hπ¯H(z¯) + (1− h)π¯L(z¯) and Π
∗(z¯∗) ≡ hπ¯∗H(z¯
∗) + (1− h)π¯∗L(z¯
∗). Given that τ
and τ∗ are greater than 1, solving equations (26) and (27) with respect to Π(z¯) and π∗(z¯∗),
we obtain [
Π(z¯)
Π∗(z¯∗)
]
=
1
1− τ−k(τ∗)−k
[ [
1− (τ∗)−k
]
ρfe[
1− τ−k
]
ρfe
]
. (28)
It is evident that ∂Π(z¯)/∂z¯ > 0 and ∂Π∗(z¯∗)/∂z¯∗ > 0. Hence, equations (28) uniquely
determine z¯ and z¯∗, as in the closed economy described in the previous section.
We will focus on the analysis of the home country. As product markets are segmented,
it is convenient to consider the relative demand for temporary workers by market. The
relative demand for temporary workers to the total employment in domestically supplied
goods is the same as the one in equation (13). Similarly, from equation (21), the relative
demand for temporary workers in exported goods is given by
RTWX(ϕ, z¯
∗) = 1−
z¯∗ + αL − τ
∗ϕ(ω1 − d)
z¯∗ + α∗H − τ
∗ϕw2
. (29)
We examine the effects of trade on the relative demand for temporary and permanent
workers in the following three scenarios: (i) symmetric trade liberalization in which τ = τ∗
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holds initially and both trade costs decline proportionally; (ii) increases in the foreign market
size (increases in L∗); and (iii) improving the foreign productivity in differentiated goods
(decreases in the upper-bound of the support of the distribution of unit labor requirements,
ϕ∗m). The first two address the effects of trade openness while the last one considers changes
in comparative advantage.
3.1.1 Symmetric Trade Liberalization
When the trade costs are symmetric, equations (28) are simplified such that
Π(z¯) = Π∗(z¯∗) =
ρfe
1 + τ−k
.
Thus, a proportional decline in the trade costs lowers z¯ and z¯∗, leading to intensified market
competition in both countries.14
Equation (29) reveals that symmetric trade liberalization has two opposite effects on the
relative demand for temporary workers in export production. On the one hand, symmet-
ric trade liberalization intensifies market competition in the export market (z¯∗ ↓), which
increases the relative demand for temporary workers (the market competition effect). On
the other hand, the decrease in τ∗, equivalent to a production efficiency gain, reduces firms’
relative demand for temporary workers (the productivity effect). In general, it is not clear
which effect is dominant, and symmetric trade liberalization may or may not increase firms’
relative demand for temporary workers in export production. In contrast, such a produc-
tivity effect does not exist in domestically supplied goods, and the relative demand for
temporary workers unambiguously increases.
3.1.2 Foreign Market Expansion
Since Π(z¯) does not include L∗, an increases in the size of the foreign economy lowers z¯∗ and
does not affect z¯. As Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) pointed out, although the increase in the
foreign market size intensifies the competition in the home market by increasing imports,
which gives a downward pressure on z¯, a smaller proportion of entrants of home firms offsets
the downward pressure.15 Thus, increases in the size of the foreign market raise the relative
14In the case of unilateral trade liberalization by the foreign country (i.e., τ∗ falls while τ is unchanged),
z¯ decreases while z¯∗ increases.
15As shown in the Appendix, as L∗ increases, the mass of home firms decreases and the mass of foreign
firms exporting to the home country increases. The decrease in home firms balances the increase in foreign
firms in the home market, leading to an unaltered total mass of firms in the home market.
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demand for temporary workers in export production without affecting that in domestically
supplied goods.
3.1.3 Comparative Advantage
All else being equal, a decrease in ϕ∗m enhances the foreign country’s comparative advantage
in the differentiated goods sector (in a Ricardian sense) and increases foreign firms’ expected
profits prior to entry. Hence, more foreign firms enter and consequently, z¯∗ falls. Similar to
increases in the foreign market size, this change does not affect the home country’s average
upper bound price, z¯. Thus, only exporting home firms increase their relative demand for
temporary workers.
These results about the effects of international trade on the relative demand for tempo-
rary and permanent workers are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In an open economy that consists of two countries that are identical except
for their market size (i.e., home and foreign),
(i) A proportional decrease in the trade costs between the two countries raises the relative
demand for temporary workers for non-exporting firms. However, the effect of the
trade cost reduction on exporting firms’ relative demand for temporary workers is
ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the size of the foreign country raises the relative demand for temporary
workers for exporting firms in the home country, but does not affect that for non-
exporting firms in the home country.
(iii) An improvement in the productivity in the differentiated goods in the foreign country
raises the relative demand for temporary workers for exporting firms in the home
country, but does not affect that for non-exporting firms in the home country.
Interestingly, international trade affects the relative demand for temporary workers dif-
ferently across firms depending on their export status. In particular, when the foreign
market size increases (e.g., emerging economies participate in the world market) or when
the foreign county improves its productivity in the differentiated goods sector, only export-
ing firms increase the relative demand for temporary workers in the home country: namely,
productive firms increase their demand for temporary workers more aggressively than un-
productive firms. Figure 1 shows the trend that larger plants increased the relative demand
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for temporary workers more aggressively than smaller plants. Although data limitation
does not allow us to empirically examine the effect of international trade at the firm level,
the observed trend is largely consistent with our model’s prediction about foreign market
expansion and foreign firms’ technological improvement.
Before closing this section, we describe the relative demand for temporary workers at the
sector level. As shown in Proposition 4, the total effect of a symmetric trade reduction on
the relative demand for temporary workers for exporting firms is unclear. However, we note
that under the Pareto distribution, a symmetric trade cost reduction unambiguously raises
the average of the relative demand for temporary workers in export production. Indeed,
the average of the relative demand for temporary workers in exported goods takes the same
form as that in domestically supplied goods:
R˜TWX(z¯
∗) = 1−
(
w2
ω1 − d
)k+1( z¯∗ + αL
z¯∗ + αH
)k+2
, (30)
which is independent of trade costs. This is because while an increase in τ∗ decreases each
firm’s exports, it also urges the least productive exporters to exit. These two effects offset
each other in the average export volume.
3.2 Outsourcing
We follow Lommerud, Meland, and Straume (2009) and Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-
Lopez (2014) in incorporating foreign outsourcing into our base model, and examine the
effects of foreign outsourcing on the relative demand for temporary and permanent workers.
Specifically, we modify the base model as follows. Each firm produces its own variety
by assembling a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] with a Leontief
technology, in which unit production of a variety of the differentiated goods requires one
unit of each intermediate good. Firms can either produce the intermediate goods (in-
house production) or purchase them from foreign suppliers at an exogenously-given price
pm (outsourcing). Labor is a single production input for the in-house production, and
each intermediate good is produced by the linear production technology described in the
base model. Thus, one unit of imported intermediate goods is equivalent to one unit of
temporary workers in production. To focus on the effects of imports of intermediate goods,
we abstract trade in the final goods.
We assume that firm i has a border intermediate good indexed by θi ∈ [0, 1] so that it
replaces in-house production with imported intermediates for all j ≥ θi. The border inter-
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mediate goods with index θi can be endogenously determined by introducing outsourcing
costs that differ across the intermediate goods. For example, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) and Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) use iceberg-type outsourcing
costs, while Lommerud, Meland, and Straume (2009) use fixed outsourcing costs. In both
formulations, it is assumed that making imported intermediate goods compatible with do-
mestically produced intermediate goods is costly and that each intermediate good has dif-
ferent outsourcing costs. Thus, by ordering the intermediate goods along the continuum of
[0,1] in a descending order with respect to the outsourcing costs, each firm may optimize the
range of outsourced intermediate goods.16 However, for analytical simplicity, we abstract
firms’ choice of the range of outsourced intermediate goods from the model and regard θi as
a state independent exogenous parameter that expresses the degree of foreign outsourcing
for firm i. Further, we assume that all outsourcing firms apply the same range of foreign
outsourcing (θi = θ for all outsourcing firms).
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We introduce a fixed cost fo for foreign outsourcing. Firms outsource the intermediate
good production only if the net profits from outsourcing are positive: πOs(ϕ, θ)−πs(ϕ)−fo ≥
0 where πOs, s = {H,L} are the flow profits of outsourcing firms. The flow profits πOs are
given by
πOH(l1, l2, ϕ, θ) =
zH(λl1 + l2)
ϕ
−
b(λl1 + l2)
2
2ϕ2
− θ(w1l1 + w2l2)− (1− θ)pm(λl1 + l2),
(31)
and
πOL(l1, ϕ, θ) =
zLλl1
ϕ
−
b(λl1)
2
2ϕ2
− θw1l1 − (1− θ)pmλl1. (32)
16More specifically, for the case of the iceberg-type outsourcing costs as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) and Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014), the price of foreign intermediate goods is given
by bt(j)pm where b is the common part of the outsourcing cost and t(j), a decreasing function of j, is the
variable part of the outsourcing cost. Firms will outsource intermediate goods j as long as bt(j)pm is cheaper
than the unit in-house production cost. The breakeven intermediate goods j = θi exist by appropriately
setting the cost parameters. Because firms’ productivity is Hicks-neutral, all firms choose the same range
of outsourcing (θi = θ for all firms). For the case of fixed outsourcing costs (as in Lommerud, Meland, and
Straume (2009)), it is assumed that the fixed outsourcing cost for intermediate goods j, k(j), is decreasing
in j. Firms with the outsourcing range [θ, 1] incur an outsourcing cost K(θ) ≡
∫
1
θ
k(j)dj. Postulating that
pm is lower than the unit in-house production cost of the intermediate goods, firms’ profits pi(θ, ϕ) are
decreasing in θ. Thus, assuming K(θ) is sufficiently convex, there exists the threshold intermediate goods
that satisfy the first order condition for maximizing the net profits pi(θ,ϕ) − K(θ). In this specification,
the range of outsourcing may vary across firms: firms with lower ϕ will outsource more intermediate goods,
while unproductive firms will not outsource any intermediate goods.
17Firms are divided into outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms according to their productivity. All
outsourcing firms chose the same outsourcing range. As Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014)
showed, the ice-berg type outsourcing costs may result in a common range of outsourcing for all outsourcing
firms.
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Foreign outsourcing can reduce the unit production cost in both states if pm ≤ ω1 holds.
To maintain the model’s tractability, we assume that this price condition is satisfied.
By defining ω˜1(θ) ≡ θω1 + (1 − θ)pm and w˜2(θ) ≡ θw2 + (1 − θ)pm, we can obtain the
maximized profits for a given z¯ as in the base model. Assuming that fo is sufficiently high
for the least productive firms not to choose outsourcing, the model identifies the threshold
productivity ϕOs at which firms are indifferent between outsourcing and self-production.
The free-entry condition closes the model as in the base model, determining the average
upper bound price z¯.
Holding z¯ constant, firms can increase profits by outsourcing more intermediate goods
for two reasons. First, the marginal cost of using foreign intermediate goods is lower than
the marginal cost of temporary workers. Thus, outsourcing more intermediate goods (θ ↓)
will increase the profits (at least in the high state). Second, outsourcing mitigates the
distortion in the employment of permanent workers by reducing the share of labor in the
total cost. This mitigation effect can be clearly observed by setting the price of intermediate
goods equal to ω1 so that there is no gain from cost reduction in the low state: the flow
profits in the low state are expressed as
πOL =
L
4ζ
[
(zL − ϕω1)
2 − (θϕd)2
]
, (33)
which gives a rise to ∂πOL/∂θ < 0. Therefore, the free-entry condition ensures that z¯
decreases as θ decreases. As foreign outsourcing increasingly prevails, each firm can improve
its profitability, which induces new entrant firms and intensifies product market competition.
The proportion of temporary workers for outsourcing firms is given by
RTWO(ϕ, z¯) =
l2
λl1 + l2
= 1−
z¯ + αL − ϕ[ω˜1(θ)− θd]
z¯ + αH − ϕw˜2(θ)
, (34)
and that for non-outsourcing firms is the same as in the base model.
Equation (34) shows that foreign outsourcing affects the relative demand for temporary
workers through three channels. First, more outsourcing (θ ↓) lowers z¯ by intensifying
product market competition. This effect raises the relative demand for temporary workers
for all firms.
Second, while foreign outsourcing reduces firms’ labor demand by substituting in-house
production with imported intermediate goods, it also increases the labor demand for in-
house production by lowering the production cost. This cost reduction effect is more pro-
nounced in the high state because the marginal production cost in the high state w2 is
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higher than that in the low state (i.e., ω1), which tends to raise the relative demand for
temporary workers.
Third, as already mentioned, foreign outsourcing mitigates the distortion in the employ-
ment of permanent workers and reduces the employment of permanent workers. Intuitively,
foreign outsourcing functions as another type of temporary worker and enables firms to
choose the employment level of permanent workers closer to the one without the firing cost.
The existing literature suggests that foreign outsourcing can increase home employment
when the the productivity gain effect overweighs the job substitution effect (e.g., Groizard,
Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014)). Our study complements the existing results by
pointing out that foreign outsourcing may create new jobs, increasing the net number, but
the share of goods jobs (in terms of job security and rewards) is likely to decrease. The
following proposition summarizes the results of foreign outsourcing.18
Proposition 5. When firms outsource more intermediate inputs, they tend to increase the
employment of temporary workers relative to permanent workers. Furthermore, if the price
of imported intermediate goods is not very low, the employment of permanent workers will
decline.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we test the empirical validity of our model of the impact of economic
globalization on the demand for permanent and temporary workers.
4.1 Empirical Strategy and Indicators of Globalization
Based on the theoretical framework discussed in the previous section, we test whether
trade openness is attributable to increases in the relative demand for temporary workers
over permanent workers. Unfortunately, firm-level data that contain information about job
18There can be another mechanism that may cause a firm to reduce its employment of permanent workers.
It is likely that the possibility of outsourcing makes the relationship between a firm and its permanent
workers less durable. A higher likelihood of layoffs may discourage permanent workers from accumulating
firm-specific skills. If so, the firm has to pay more to its permanent workers to induce their effort in acquiring
firm-specific skills, which will reduce the demand for permanent workers. However, we abstract this dynamics
from our model not only to maintain the model’s tractability, but also to emphasize the effects of product
market competition and the mitigation of the biased employment of permanent workers. In a similar vein,
our analysis is a static comparison between two different values of θ.
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types were not available to us. Hence, we rely on sector level data and estimate reduced-
form equations for the response of the proportion of temporary workers to various indices
of economic internationalization, controlling for the effects of other potential causes. We
estimate the following reduced-form regression:
RTWit = X
′
gitβg +X
′
itβ + di + dt + uit, (35)
where RTWit is the ratio of temporary workers to total employment in industry i at time
t, Xgit is a set of explanatory variables that measure economic internationalizaton, Xit is
a set of control variables including technological changes, and di and dt represent industry
and time fixed effects, respectively. The industry dummy variables absorb all unobservable
industry-specific effects. For example, some industries may intrinsically have high demand
for temporary workers depending on the variability of their business. The year dummies ab-
sorb all time effects common across industries such as economy-wide regulation changes and
macroeconomic effects. In particular, we expect that the year dummies deal appropriately
with the effect of the Worker Dispatching Act in 2004 that has enabled private temporary
job agencies to dispatch workers to manufacturers since 2004. In addition, business cycles
would influence the demand for permanent and temporary workers (Wasmer, 1999). The
year dummies also absorb all such macroeconomic effects.19
Letting TempDit(TempXit) and TotalDit(TotalXit) denote the employment of tempo-
rary and total workers in domestically supplied (exported) output, respectively, the depen-
dent variable in (35) can be decomposed as follows:
RTWit =
TempDit + TempXit
TotalDit + TotalXit
= (1− EXit)
TempDit
TotalDit
+ EXit
TempXit
TotalXit
, (36)
where EXit ≡ TotalXit/(TotalDit+TotalXit) is the employment share of exported output in
the total employment. Our theory predicts that trade openness (including outsourcing) in-
fluences the average ratios of temporary workers, TempDit/TotalDit and TempXit/TotalXit,
through changes in z¯ and z¯∗ (see equations (20) and (30)). This decomposition suggests
that in addition to trade openness, RTWit can be affected by the employment share of
19Another macroeconomic effect in the Japanese labor markets is increases in social insurance taxes (e.g.,
unemployment insurance, pension fund, and health insurance). Japanese firms are obliged to pay these
taxes partially when employing permanent workers, but can evade this burden for temporary workers when
certain labor conditions are satisfied. Thus, when the government increases social insurance taxes, the
relative labor cost of permanent to temporary workers would increase, leading to higher proportions of
temporary workers. Such government policy changes are in general uniform across sectors. Thus, the year
dummy also appropriately absorbs this effect.
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exported output. Therefore, we will include the export share of the total output in Xit as
a proxy for EXit.
Our theory suggests that firms use temporary workers as a buffer against employment
fluctuations, which implies that, whereas the employment of permanent workers is insensi-
tive to output changes, that of temporary workers shows a positive correlation with output.
In addition, foreign outsourcing is likely to affect the relative demand for temporary work-
ers by lowering the employment of permanent workers. Thus, we also examine changes in
the numbers of permanent and temporary workers by replacing the dependent variable in
equation (35) with the number of permanent and temporary workers.
We collected our data from different sources. For information about permanent and
temporary workers, we used the Establishment and Enterprise Census. Covering all sites
and firms, the census provides detailed workforce information according to the three-digit
Japanese Industrial Classification. The data are available for four years (1999, 2001, 2004,
and 2006).20 We define total labor input as the sum of permanent employees, temporary
employees, and workers dispatched from temporary employment agencies. We also define
the number of temporary workers as the sum of temporary employees and workers dis-
patched from temporary employment agencies. The fraction of temporary workers in total
labor input is calculated for each manufacturing industry.
We construct explanatory variables using the Japan Industrial Productivity Database
2009 (JIP 2009) and the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT). The JIP 2009
database contains annual data on 108 sectors covering the entire Japanese economy from
1970 to 2006, counting 52 manufacturing sectors. INDSTAT provides production-related
data such as value added according to the three-digit ISIC Revision 3 classification. Based
on these two databases, we construct indices of world market competition, outsourcing, and
other control variables for each manufacturing industry. We begin with four key explanatory
variables.
• World share of value added: We use the Japanese share of value added among OECD
countries from the INDSTAT.21 In our theoretical model, both increasing foreign
20The Japanese government began the Economic Census, a new comprehensive census, in 2010 as a
replacement for the Establishment and Enterprise Census. The latest data from the Establishment and
Enterprise Census is for 2006. One appealing characteristic of the Establishment and Enterprise Census is
the comprehensive coverage of firms and detailed classifications of the workforce. The census reports the
total number of workers, the number of employees, the number of permanent employees, the number of
temporary employees, and the number of workers dispatched from temporary employment agencies.
21INDSTAT reports value added in current U.S. dollars. Two sets of the world share of value added are
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market size and improving foreign productivity intensify product market competition
in the foreign market and lower the home country’s output share in the world. Further
as long as the size of the home country is smaller than the foreign country, symmetric
trade cost reductions also reduce the home country’s output share with fierce product
market competition. We, thus, interpret a decline in the share of value added as a
sign of intensified global competition and expect a negative sign in the estimation of
the ratio of temporary workers and a positive sign for the employment of permanent
workers.
• Share of imported intermediate goods: This index captures the extent to which each
industry relies on imported intermediate inputs as a proxy index of outsourcing. Fol-
lowing Feenstra and Hanson (1999), we construct this index using the input-output
table and import data in JIP 2009.22 Based on our model of foreign outsourcing, we
expect that the sign of the coefficient is positive for the ratio of temporary workers
and negative for the employment of permanent workers.
• Export share: The ratio of exports to output is calculated from JIP 2009. This is a
proxy measure of the employment share of exported products in total employment.
Without intensified product market competition, the ratio of temporary workers at
the sector level could still increase when the export share rises if the ratio of temporary
workers in exports is higher than that in domestic supply. We need to control this
effect to identify the effects of product market competition. Assuming that the world
market is more competitive than the Japanese domestic market, we expect that the
coefficient is positive for the ratio of temporary workers.
• Real output: As has been discussed, fluctuations in real output are mostly absorbed
by the employment of temporary workers. Hence, we expect that the coefficient of
real output has a positive sign in the regressions of the ratio and number of tempo-
rary workers, while being not statistically insignificant in the permanent employment
regression.
prepared. One is simply computed from the original data. For the other, we convert the unit of values from
current U.S. dollars to PPP-based U.S. dollars. PPP-based U.S. dollars are taken from the Penn World
Table 6.3. Both measures give similar results in our estimation, so we report the results of the PPP-based
world share of valued added.
22Feenstra and Hanson (1999) propose two foreign outsourcing indices: one includes non-energy inputs
from all industries and the other one uses only within-industry purchases. As the two indices did not generate
substantially different results, we report the results by the first (broadly defined) outsourcing measure.
26
Among these four explanatory variables, the first two are especially interesting for us.
However, it should be noted that the index for outsourcing (the share of imported inter-
mediates) tends to suffer from reverse causality: firms can increase outsourcing simply by
reducing the number of permanent workers and increasing the number of temporary work-
ers. Although we admit that it is difficult to control for such reverse causality using our
dataset, we attempt two-stage least squares (2SLS). We use the event of the Chinese acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001 as a natural experimental event. As we will verify, this event is
highly likely to affect Japanese firms’ outsourcing activity, but not directly influence firms’
decisions on the relative demand for permanent workers. More concretely, we create an
instrumental variable by multiplying the share of trade (export plus import) with China in
total trade with a time dummy that is 0 before 2001 but 1 afterwards.
To control possible influences on the temporary worker ratio other than international
markets, we also include the following indicators: the capital-labor ratio, technological
changes, and demographical changes. All indicators are calculated from JIP 2009.
• Capital intensity (K/L): Saving labor adjustment costs may be less important in high-
capital-intensity industries than in low-capital-intensity industries. Alternatively,
firm-specific skills may be more important in industries with high capital intensity;
such industries may hold high upper bounds in the number of permanent employees
and show low proportions of temporary workers. We expect that the coefficient is
negative in the temporary-ratio regression.
• Total factor productivity (TFP): It is a priori uncertain how TFP would affect the
relative employment of temporary and permanent workers. If it captures Hicks-neutral
technological change, it is highly likely that this index is neutral for the ratio of
temporary workers. Conditioning upon real output, this index will not be significant
in both temporary and permanent employment regressions. However, technological
changes may yield biased labor demand changes, which in turn may affect the ratio
of temporary workers.
• Information technology (IT): The literature on “job polarization” emphasizes that the
rapid development of IT (computerization) has encouraged the replacement of labor by
computers for routine tasks, decreasing the demand for middle-skilled jobs relative to
high-skilled and low-skilled jobs (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).23 Firms are likely
23Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) and Goos and Manning (2007) study the effect of computerization
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to use temporary labor contracts (or dispatched workers) for routine jobs, resulting
in increases in demand for temporary workers. We use the ratio of computers and
other IT-related equipment to total labor input (IT-capital intensity) as a proxy of
the prevalence of IT.
• Demographic changes: It is known that elderly or female workers are likely to have
temporary labor contracts. For this reason, increases in elderly or female workers can
raise the ratio of temporary workers. To control for these effects, we include the ratio
of workers aged 55 or over and the ratio of female workers into our regressions.
To match the data from the Establishment and Enterprise Census with those constructed
from JIP 2009 and UNIDO’s INDSTAT, we use the industrial classification of JIP 2009 to
the greatest extent possible. Although we have to merge some industries, we can construct a
balanced longitudinal dataset of 45 manufacturing industries between 1996 and 2006, where
the labor data with labor classifications are limited to four periods (1999, 2001, 2004, and
2006).
4.2 Data Description
Before proceeding to estimation, it is useful to examine the data for temporary and perma-
nent workers in Japan. Table 1 presents the ratio of temporary workers to total workers
across manufacturing sectors in Japan. The first two columns, the ratios of temporary
workers in 1999 and 2006, show that shifts from permanent to temporary workers occurred
in almost all manufacturing sectors. The top five sectors with high ratios of temporary
workers in 2006 are Other Processed Food (4), Fish Products (2), Meat Products (1), Glass
Products (23), and Plastic Products (44). Leather Products (14) and Beverages (6) also
have high ratios of temporary workers. The ratio in Other Processed Food reaches approx-
imately 60%. However, these sectors tend to have high temporary worker ratios as of 1999,
and the shifts from permanent to temporary workers were not so striking.
More dramatic shifts from permanent to temporary workers can be found in Motor
Vehicles (41) and Chemical Fibers and Textiles (18). The third column presents the average
annual growth rate of the ratio of temporary workers during 1999–2006. The Motor Vehicles
sector records a more than 10% annual growth rate, and the Chemical Fibers and Textiles
sectors follow at about 9%. The fourth column presents annual growth rates of the ratio of
and outsourcing on job polarization.
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temporary workers during 2004–06. In most industries, the average growth rates per annum
of this period fall below those in the full sample period, which implies that the effect of the
Worker Dispatching Act in 2004 may be limited.
The Establishment and Enterprise Census allows the inclusion of information about the
number of permanent and temporary workers by enterprise size measured as the number of
employees. Although we are unable to use these data for estimation because of the inacces-
sibility of matched firm-activity data, observing which firms change their relative demand
for temporary workers is helpful when interpreting estimation results. Figure 1 presents
changes in the ratio of temporary workers between 1999 and 2006 by establishment size.
The figure shows that (i) in 1999, the ratio of temporary workers tended to become lower
as the size of establishment increased, (ii) the shift from permanent to temporary workers
mainly occurred in larger establishments, and (iii) as a result, the variation in the ratios of
temporary workers across establishments substantially decreased. The recent literature on
heterogeneous trade firms has empirically revealed that only sufficiently productive firms
can cover fixed entry costs and will be internationalized through trade.24 Because the size
of enterprises is in general positively correlated with their productivity, the figure suggests
that the numbers of temporary workers dramatically increased in enterprises that are likely
to be engaged in international activities.
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables mentioned above are reported in Table
2. Because some measures including the world share of value added are limited to the nine
years between 1997 and 2005, we take the same period for other measures. We find that
the Japanese share is incredibly high (more than 80%) in Fish and Coal Products, which
is simply because some countries’ data are not reported in INDSTAT. We therefore drop
these two industries from our sample, leaving 43 industries for regression.
Table 2 confirms that Japanese manufacturers have reduced the employment of perma-
nent workers (defined as full-time workers) and increased the number of temporary workers
during the sample period. In particular, among temporary workers, they have substantially
increased the use of dispatched workers. As for globalization-related variables, the share
of imported input increased more distinctively from about 6.1% to 8.6%. The world share
of value added also has decreased by 0.7 percentage points during the sample period. The
24These studies include Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) for the United States, Tomiura (2007)
for Japan, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for various EU countries, and Kasahara and Lapham (2013) for some
developing countries.
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export share has increased from 13.7% to 17.6%.
Turning to the variables representing industrial characteristics and technological changes,
TFP has slightly improved during the sample period. While Japanese manufacturers have
increased their capital stock by about 44% during the sample period, they have increased
their IT-related capital stock more aggressively, resulting in an increase in the share of
IT-related capital in total capital by 2 percentage points. The share of elderly workers has
increased by 5%, but that of female workers has declined during the sample period.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Impact on Ratio of Temporary Workers
The estimation results on the ratio of temporary workers to total labor input are reported
in Table 3. The coefficients of year dummies and fixed effects by industry are suppressed
for brevity. As is expected, the impact of increases in world share of value added is negative
and statistically significant (columns (1) and (3)), implying that the share of temporary
workers increases when industries experience some loss of world share of value added. When
estimated with the share of imported intermediate goods, the world share of value added is
still significant at the 1% level.
The effect of outsourcing measured by the share of imported intermediate goods is
positive and significant (columns (2) and (3)). Because the ratios of temporary workers and
imported intermediates are expressed as percentages, a parameter estimate of 0.33 implies
that a 10% increase in the share of imported intermediates will raise the ratio of temporary
workers by 3.3 percentage points. These results support our hypothesis on outsourcing:
industries with more outsourcing tend to increase their relative use of temporary workers.
We obtain positive and statistically significant coefficients for export share. Industries
with larger increases in exports tend to increase the fraction of temporary workers in total
labor input. This indicates that the ratio of temporary workers for exports is higher than
that for domestically supplied goods, which is consistent with our theory. Furthermore, real
output is significant at the 1% level with the correct sign. The parameter estimate of 0.07
implies that a 10% increase in real output will raise the share of temporary workers by 0.7
percentage points. This estimate is consistent with the theoretical model.
Capital intensity shows a negative sign with marginal significance. However, the effect
is almost negligible. Technology-related variables such as the log of TFP and IT-capital
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intensity in general do not have significant explanatory power for the ratio of temporary
workers.25 Two demographic variables–Elderly worker ratio and Female worker ratio–are
not statistically significant although the sign of the female worker ratio is as expected. These
results suggest that the demographic change in labor force during the sample period was
not a major reason for the demand shift toward temporary workers in the manufacturing
sector.
Overall, the estimation results indicate a correlation between relative increases in the
employment of temporary workers and the indices of world market competition and foreign
outsourcing in the Japanese manufacturing sector. In contrast, technological change in the
IT field appears to be irrelevant to the recent shift from permanent to temporary workers.
5.2 Impact on the Employment of Permanent and Temporary Workers
To examine further how internationalization would change the demand for temporary and
permanent workers, we perform regressions of the log of the employment of permanent and
temporary workers on the internationalization indices. In particular, we expect that the
two indices of internationalization—world share of value added and the share of imported
input—affect only permanent workers. In contrast, real output is positively correlated
with the employment of temporary workers and irrelevant to the employment of permanent
workers.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. We find that the estimation results largely
support the predictions of the theoretical model. The coefficient of the world share of value
added is significant and shows the predicted sign with respect to permanent workers. The
share of imported input is negative and significant at the 1% level with respect to permanent
workers. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithm and the share of imported input
is a percentage. Hence, an estimate of −2.9 implies that as the share of imported input
increases by 10 percentage points, the employment of permanent workers on average will
decrease by 0.29%.
In contrast, these two explanatory variables are not statistically significant with respect
to the employment or temporary workers. Instead, the coefficient of the log of real output
is positive and significant only for temporary workers, consistent with the theory. While
the coefficient of export share for permanent workers is positive but not significant, it is
positive and significant for temporary workers, which reflects that temporary workers are
25Replacing IT-capital intensity with IT-capital share does not alter the estimation results.
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more aggressively used in export production than on average.
These results imply that the direction of causality is likely to be as expected from
the model’s predictions. For example, firms may decrease domestic employment to use
imported intermediates more aggressively. However, this mechanism hardly explains why
firms decrease only the number of permanent workers, in spite of their adjustment costs.
It is natural to interpret this estimation result as meaning that increasing opportunities for
using imported intermediates raise the expected adjustment cost of permanent workers, so
firms reduce their employment of permanent workers. The interpretation of the results for
world share of value added is more straightforward. It is unlikely that firms decrease their
permanent workforce, giving rise to decreases in their world share of value added in that
industry.
Furthermore, the result from the 2SLS estimation for the share of imported input is
reported in column 3 of Table 4. The share of imported inputs remains statistically signif-
icant. The coefficient of the share of imported input increases in 2SLS, compared to that
in the OLS with fixed effects, which suggests that the simultaneity of the employment of
permanent workers and outsourcing is likely to underestimate the impact of outsourcing on
the employment of permanent workers. Consequently, we confirm two convincing channels
of globalization—outsourcing and world market competition—that reduce firms’ demand
for permanent workers.
The coefficient of TFP is not significant for both permanent and temporary workers,
which suggests that there is no room for TFP to influence the employment of permanent and
temporary workers after controlling for output.26 Capital intensity affects only permanent
workers, but is almost negligible in magnitude. IT-capital intensity is not significant for
both permanent and temporary workers, which clearly denies the effect of the prevalence of
IT-technology.27 Increases in the ratio of female workers raise the employment of temporary
workers. This result is also consistent with the fact that the share of temporary workers is
higher among female workers than male workers.
Overall, employing industry-level datasets, we find that more outsourcing (proxied by
increases in the share of imported inputs) tends to decrease the employment of permanent
workers. In addition, we find that in industries where world value added share declines, firms
26As Table 2 shows, TFP has hardly changed during the sample period. We note that this particular
trend of TFP might contribute to generating these non-significant results.
27Using IT-capital share in total capital stock instead of IT-capital intensity does not change the results
at all, so we do not report this in detail.
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tend to reduce the employment of permanent workers. This is another globalization conduit
that we identified. Furthermore, we show that firms are encouraged to hire more temporary
workers when their sales increasingly rely on foreign markets (increases in export share),
or when their market positions deteriorate (decreases in world share in valued added).
These results confirm that firms use more temporary workers as a buffer against output
fluctuations from globalized market competition.
6 Conclusions
This paper examined whether economic globalization, such as trade and outsourcing, affects
firms’ demands for temporary and permanent workers. For this purpose, we developed
a simple monopolistic competition model in which firms may use temporary workers as
well as permanent workers to evade the firing cost accompanied with permanent workers.
Our theoretical model emphasized two features: (i) a firm sets an upper bound for the
employment of permanent workers and uses temporary workers to fill the gap between its
realized labor demand and this upper bound; and (ii) trade openness and foreign outsourcing
intensify product market competition, and facing more elastic product demand, firms tend
to increase their relative demand for temporary workers.
Our model also yields interesting insights on the relative demand for temporary in
heterogeneous firms. More productive firms tend to have lower proportions of temporary
workers than un productive firms. In our open economy setting, increases in the foreign
market size or improvement in the foreign country’s productivity for differentiated goods
raise the relative demand for temporary workers only for exporting firms in the home
country. These observations are largely consistent to the trend of the ratio of temporary
workers in Japanese manufacturing firms.
The model highlights the role of product market competition: product market compe-
tition enlarges the impact of output fluctuations caused by taste shocks by making firms’
product demand more elastic, which induces firms to use more temporary workers, resulting
in a higher proportion of temporary workers within the same firm. In addition, the model
identified that foreign outsourcing functions as inexpensive labor without adjustment costs.
By using imported intermediate goods, firms can correct the distortion in the employment
of permanent workers for in-house production, which reduces the demand for permanent
workers.
33
We also empirically tested the validity of the model’s predictions by constructing an
industry-level panel dataset. Our main empirical findings are as follows: First, the world
share of value added showed the correct sign: industries tend to decrease the relative de-
mand for permanent workers when losing competitive positions in the world market. Second,
increases in outsourcing raise the ratio of temporary workers to total labor input by de-
creasing the employment of permanent workers. In sum, we conclude that world market
competition and outsourcing may explain the structural demand shift toward temporary
workers in Japanese manufacturers.
Although the estimation presented plausible results, it needs qualifications. The current
empirical analysis is confined to industry-level data, although we reinforced it by presenting
the fact that the recent employment shift to temporary workers has mainly occurred among
large establishments. Using firm- or establishment-level data with location information can
definitely enrich our study in terms of more precisely identifying globalization channels.
Due to data limitation, we did not examine the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI),
but obviously this does not mean that FDI does not affect the employment of temporary
and permanent workers. In theory, vertical FDI should have similar effects on the relative
demand for temporary workers as foreign outsourcing, and it would be interesting to test
the validity of this conjecture. These issues are left for future research.
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Table 1: Ratios of Temporary Workers in 1999 and 2006 and Their Growth Rates
Industry Ratio of Temporary Workers Annual Growth Rate
1999 2006 1999–2006 2004–2006
1 Meat products 0.44 0.50 1.6 −1.3
2 Fish products 0.50 0.54 0.9 −0.9
3 Grain mill products 0.25 0.32 3.4 3.7
4 Other processed food 0.51 0.58 1.8 0.1
5 Prepared animal feeds 0.24 0.31 3.8 6.3
6 Beverages 0.30 0.36 2.4 −1.7
7 Tobacco 0.06 0.09 6.2 30.2
8 Textiles and fabrics 0.30 0.32 1.0 −1.3
9 Wood products 0.17 0.23 3.9 0.6
10 Furniture 0.17 0.25 5.1 3.4
11 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 0.11 0.15 4.0 −1.9
12 Other paper products 0.25 0.30 2.8 −0.4
13 Printing 0.18 0.22 2.4 −1.8
14 Leather products 0.37 0.37 0.2 −2.8
15 Rubber products 0.23 0.33 5.4 3.6
16 Fertilizer 0.13 0.18 4.7 5.2
17 Chemical products 0.13 0.17 4.5 9.9
18 Chemical fiber and textiles 0.13 0.24 9.1 11.3
19 Other chemical products 0.21 0.29 4.5 0.7
20 Pharmaceutical 0.13 0.21 7.1 4.1
21 Refined petroleum products 0.08 0.12 6.4 3.2
22 Coal products 0.16 0.19 2.3 1.7
23 Glass products 0.26 0.38 5.6 4.9
24 Cement and concrete 0.15 0.22 4.8 5.9
25 Ceramics 0.21 0.29 5.0 2.6
26 Other ceramic products 0.15 0.22 5.9 4.8
27 Pig iron and steel 0.13 0.13 −0.6 13.5
28 Other iron and steel products 0.12 0.20 7.4 0.8
29 Non-ferrous metal refining 0.18 0.23 2.9 2.6
30 Non-ferrous metal 0.17 0.24 5.0 1.2
31 Architectural metal products 0.20 0.25 3.6 2.9
32 Other metal products 0.22 0.28 3.3 1.0
33 General industrial machinery 0.14 0.22 6.9 7.5
34 Office machinery 0.26 0.30 2.2 −7.2
35 Heavy electrical machinery 0.20 0.31 6.1 7.8
36 Radio and Television 0.22 0.32 5.2 0.6
37 Accounting and computing machines 0.23 0.33 5.3 2.3
38 Electronic instrument 0.22 0.32 5.2 0.2
39 Electronic parts 0.23 0.32 5.1 0.3
40 Other electrical equipment 0.22 0.33 5.9 6.3
41 Motor vehicle and its parts 0.14 0.29 10.6 5.5
42 Other transport equipment 0.24 0.29 2.8 2.1
43 Precision machinery 0.21 0.29 5.0 1.8
44 Plastic products 0.30 0.38 3.1 −0.1
45 Other manufacturing 0.29 0.33 1.9 −0.3
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on the Establishment and Enterprise Census and the JIP database
2009. Growth rates are in percent.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Growth Rate
Dependent & Explanatory Variables 1999 2006 1999–2006 2004–2006
Ratio of temporary workers (RTW) 0.207 0.275 33.1 3.9
(0.073) (0.075) (2.8) (−7.9)
ln(Permanent) 11.741 11.556 −1.6 0.0
(0.943) (0.947) (0.4) (1.2)
ln(Temporary) 9.808 9.968 1.6 −0.4
(1.409) (1.241) (−11.9) (0.5)
1998 2005 1998–2005 2003–2005
Outsourcing
Share of imported input 0.061 0.086 40.2 11.4
(0.044) (0.076) (73.8) (9.0)
Product market competition
World share of value added 0.151 0.144 −4.3 0.3
(0.051) (0.058) (13.6) (8.2)
Export share 0.137 0.176 29.0 12.8
(0.124) (0.163) (31.4) (10.2)
Industry characteristics
ln(Output) 15.365 15.324 −0.3 0.2
(0.879) (1.008) (14.8) (4.5)
Capital intensity 28.462 41.036 44.2 13.4
(41.721) (61.275) (46.9) (13.7)
ln(TFP) 4.744 4.786 0.9 0.6
(0.206) (0.302) (46.8) (14.4)
IT-Capital share 0.111 0.130 17.2 8.9
(0.066) (0.076) (16.1) (8.1)
IT-Capital intensity 2.803 4.783 70.6 26.0
(3.445) (5.615) (63.0) (30.5)
Elderly workers share 0.208 0.249 19.8 3.1
(0.066) (0.075) (14.0) (3.3)
Female workers share 0.306 0.275 −10.0 −5.5
(0.117) (0.108) (−8.1) (−4.8)
Source: JIP 2009 and UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT). The estimated sample
excludes two industries: Fish products and Coal products. For these two industries the Japanese
share of value added is incredibly high. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 3: Impact of Globalization on the Ratio of Temporary Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable RTW RTW RTW
World share of value added −0.380∗ −0.415∗∗
(0.158) (0.151)
Share of imported input 0.292∗ 0.326∗
(0.141) (0.145)
Export share 0.205∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.139∗
(0.064) (0.045) (0.052)
ln(output) 0.059∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Capital intensity −0.000 −0.000+ −0.000+
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(TFP) −0.007 0.015 −0.000
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
IT-capital intensity 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Elderly worker ratio −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female worker ratio 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 172 172 172
R2 0.863 0.861 0.877
Notes: Fixed effects regression with time-specific effects. All regressors related to global-
ization are lagged by one-year. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors are in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Impact of Globalization on the Employment of Permanent and
Temporary Workers
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE IV
ln(Permanent) ln(Temporary) ln(Permanent)
World share of value added 2.152∗ −1.207+ 2.255∗∗
(0.998) (0.710) (0.610)
Share of imported input −2.960∗∗ −0.455 −3.899∗∗
(0.647) (0.740) (1.345)
Export ratio 0.346 0.961∗∗ 0.535
(0.206) (0.339) (0.338)
ln(output) 0.100 0.461∗∗ 0.064
(0.080) (0.108) (0.079)
Capital intensity 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(TFP) −0.029 −0.062 −0.048
(0.080) (0.077) (0.071)
IT-capital intensity −0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Elderly worker ratio −0.002 −0.024 −0.002
(0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
Female worker ratio 0.011 0.039∗∗ 0.008
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 172 172 172
R2 0.764 0.679 0.755
Notes: Fixed effects regression with time-specific effects. All regressors related to global-
ization are lagged by one-year. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors are in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. The
first stage F-stat is 16.7 in (3).
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Figure 1: Ratio of Temporary Workers by Establishment Size
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Partially differentiating the ratio of permanent workers to the total employment with respect
to z¯ generates
zH − w2 − zL −
w1
λ
+
ρ+ β
γ
(
w2 −
w1
λ
)
= b(λl1 + l2)− bλl1 > 0. (A.1)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Partially differentiating the ratio of permanent workers to the total employment with respect
to ϕ generates
w2zL − (ω1 − d)zH . (A.2)
Thus, as long as Assumption 1 holds, the derivative is positive.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating the average profits prior to entry gives
∂π¯s(z¯)
∂z¯
= πs(z¯, ϕs)
∂ϕs
∂z¯
+
∫ ϕs(z¯)
0
∂π¯s(z¯, ϕ)
∂z¯
dG(ϕ) > 0 (A.3)
because the first term is zero and the second term is strictly positive (see equations (15)
and (16)).
From equations (15) and (16), the partial derivatives of π¯s in terms of L and ζ are
straightforward:
∂π¯s
∂L
> 0 and
∂π¯s
∂ζ
< 0. (A.4)
As for the productivity improvement in the differentiated goods, we consider decreases
in the lower bound of the productivity distribution for a given technology G(ϕ). Thus, for
ϕ′m < ϕm, we have g(ϕ;ϕ
′
m) ≥ g(ϕ;ϕm) for all ϕ, which implies that
∂π¯s
∂ϕm
< 0. (A.5)
Therefore, increases in L, decreases in ζ, or decreases in ϕm lower z¯:
dz¯
dL
< 0,
dz¯
dζ
, and
dz¯
dϕm
> 0. (A.6)
Using Proposition 1, we obtain the results in Proposition 3.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The ratio of permanent workers to the total employment is given by
z¯ + αL − ϕ[ω˜1(θ)− θd]
z¯ + αH − ϕw˜2(θ)
. (A.7)
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Differentiating this ratio with respect to θ yields
∂z¯
∂θ
[(zH − ϕw˜2)− (zL − ϕ(ω˜1 − θd))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
market competition effect
+ ϕd (zH − ϕw˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
adjustment mitigation effect
+ ϕ(w2 − pm) [zL − ϕ(ω˜1 − θd)]− ϕ(ω˜1 − pm) (zH − ϕw˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity gain effect
. (A.8)
The first term represents the effect of product market competition and the sign is posi-
tive. The second term represents the effect that foreign outsourcing reduces the employment
distortion in permanent workers and the sign is positive. The last two terms represent the
effect of productivity gains from outsourcing. The total sign of the productivity effect is
not clear because the productivity gain from outsourcing is always smaller in the low state
than in the high state. For example, suppose that pm = ω1. Then, the last term disappears,
and the sign of the productivity gain effect becomes positive. Thus, as long as the price of
imported intermediate goods is not much lower than ω1, the total sign of the productivity
effect will be positive. Thus, the fraction of temporary workers in the total employment is
likely to increase as θ falls (more outsourcing).
B Appendix: Technical Notes
B.1 Wage Determination
This appendix explicitly considers a wage determination mechanism. For this purpose, we
follow the standard efficiency wage model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), but note that
other models of imperfect labor markets could generate similar results. It is assumed that
the effort level is discrete such that e = {0, e¯} and measured in units of the numeraire goods.
Workers with the effort level e¯ have relative productivity λ > 1. Otherwise, workers are
less productive and the productivity is normalized to one. As usual, because monitoring
workers’ effort level is too costly, firms instead offer a wage premium to workers to induce
their effort. We argue that long-term labor contracts with high job security can induce
workers’ effort with less cost than fixed-duration contracts. Thus, the model can predict
a dual structure of employment, in which ex ante homogenous workers become ex post
heterogeneous within a sector: some workers enjoy stable jobs with higher wages, whereas
others accept unstable jobs with lower wages.
Workers obtain either long-term or fixed-duration labor contracts, and there are no
unemployed (because of the homogenous goods sector). We denote by Ek the expected
present value of being employed with a long-term contract and not shirk in state k = H,L.
Likewise, Sk denotes the expected present value of being employed with a long-term contract
but shirking, and U is the present value of working as a temporary worker. The value of
EH is given by
EH = (w1H − e¯)dt+ (1− ρdt) [(1− γdt)EH + γdtθEL + γdt(1− θ)U ] , (B.1)
where θ ≡ l1L/l1H is the probability of being retained when the firm is hit by a bad shock.
The first term in the RHS of equation (B.1) represents the flow utility from receiving the
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wage in the high state and making effort e¯. The second term is the expected future value:
the worker continues being employed in the high state with probability (1 − γdt), being
employed in the low state with probability γdtθ, and being unemployed with probability
γdt(1− θ). Although we have already showed that permanent workers are never dismissed
when temporary workers are available, leading to θ = 1, we maintain θ for generality.
The value of being employed with a long-term contract without shirking in the low state,
EL, is simply given by
EL = (w1L − e¯)dt+ (1− ρdt) [(1− βdt)EL + βdtEH ] . (B.2)
If an employed worker is shirking, it will increase their flow utility by e¯, but when shirking
is detected, the worker will be fired and obtain the value of being a temporary worker,
U . As is standard, the firm sets w1k such that workers are indifferent between exerting an
effort and shirking: Sk = Ek. Letting the flow probability that detection occurs be qdt, the
non-shirking condition is given by e¯ = q(Ek − U), which implies that
EH = EL = U +
e¯
q
. (B.3)
Applying (B.3) to equations (B.1) and (B.2) and rearranging a little, efficiency wages for
permanent workers can be expressed as
w1H = e¯+ ρ(U + e¯/q) + γ(1− θ)e¯/q, (B.4)
w1L = e¯+ ρ(U + e¯/q). (B.5)
Equations (B.4) and (B.5) imply that when firms are in the high state, firms have to pay a
higher wage in the high state than the low state to incentivize permanent workers not to shirk
when their jobs are less secure. However, if temporary workers are available, permanent
workers will be never dismissed. Thus, θ = 1 and w1H = w1L is the case. We hereafter drop
the subscript for the state from the permanent wage unless it causes confusion.
Finally, the value of being employed as a temporary worker is given by
U = w2dt+ (1− ρdt)[adtEk + (1− adt)U ], (B.6)
where w2 is the wage rate for temporary workers and a denotes the probability of finding a
position as a permanent worker. Substituting (B.3) into (B.6) leads to
U =
w2 + ae¯/q
ρ
. (B.7)
Substituting (B.7) into (B.4) and (B.5) and using θ = 1, we obtain
w1 = w2 + e¯+ (ρ+ a)e¯/q (B.8)
The wage for permanent workers is increasing in a, which can be interpreted an index of
the tightness of the labor market.
In the employment policy that we consider here, permanent workers are never dismissed.
Therefore, substituting a = 0, the wage for permanent workers is given by
w1 = w2 + e˜, (B.9)
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where e˜ ≡ (ρ+ q)e¯/q. The condition of w1 < λw2 can be expressed as
(λ− 1)w2 >
(ρ+ q)e¯
q
,
and we assume that this condition holds. The wage for temporary workers is given by the
labor productivity in the homogenous good sector, and the wage for permanent workers is
given by that for temporary workers plus the effort premium.
B.2 The Derivation of −δ ≤ V ′L(l1, ϕ) < 0
Suppose that V ′L(l1, ϕ) > 0, that is, the marginal benefit from increasing the employment
of permanent workers is positive in the low state. If this is the case, the firm would increase
the employment of permanent workers in the low state. This cannot be an equilibrium
because the firm are willing to increase permanent jobs in the low state.
From equation (11), V ′L(l1) = 0 leads to zL/ϕ − bλl1/ϕ
2 = ω1, which implies that the
marginal revenue in the low state equals the wage of permanent workers. This condition is
applicable only when permanent workers are not associated with a firing cost.
If temporary workers are unavailable, the firm will change the employment level of
permanent workers depending on the state. When the state switches from high to low, the
firm will dismiss permanent workers until the marginal benefit for reducing the employment
in the low state is equalized to the (marginal) firing cost, namely, V ′L(l1, ϕ) = −δ.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 3. In the figure, V ′L(l1, ϕ) is decreasing in
l1. If there is no firing cost for permanent workers, then, the firm would choose the optimal
employment level of permanent workers by setting V ′L(l1, ϕ) = 0 (Point A). In contrast,
with firing cost δ, the firm would choose the employment of permanent workers such that
V ′L(l1, ϕ) = −δ (Point B). In the low state, the firm employs too many permanent workers
due to the firing cost.
We argue that, if temporary workers are available, the employment of permanent workers
in the low state will be somewhere between l∗1L and l¯1L in Figure 3. Equation (10) can be
rearranged as follows.
V ′L(l1, ϕ) = −
λw2 − w1
γ
. (B.10)
Because of λw2 > w1, we have V
′
L(l1, ϕ) < 0. To prove −δ ≤ V
′
L(l1, ϕ), it is sufficient to
show that (λw2 − w1)/γ ≤ δ. This condition can be rewritten as
λw2 ≤ w1 + γδ, (B.11)
and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of permanent workers in the high state, given
that fixed-duration contracts are unavailable. In the case of the employment policy in the
main text (i.e., firms fill new jobs only with temporary workers), the inequality is strict.
Thus, we establish −δ ≤ V ′L(l1, ϕ) < 0.
In Figure 3, given that fixed-duration contracts are available, the employment of per-
manent workers in the low state is depicted at point C, which shows that the availability
of temporary workers allows firms to choose a more efficient employment level in the low
state.
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B.3 Iso-elastic Demand
This appendix shows that the relative demand for temporary workers to the total employ-
ment is neutral with respect to (i) market size and (ii) heterogeneity in firm productivity
when we assume an iso-elastic demand for the differentiated goods.
Suppose that the representative consumer’s utility function is given by
U = q1−φ0
[∫
i∈Ω
αiq
(σ−1)/σ
i di
]φσ/(σ−1)
, φ ∈ (0, 1), σ > 1, (B.12)
where q0 and qi denote consumption of the homogenous good and variety i of the differen-
tiated goods, respectively, and ai > 0 are taste parameters variable over time. Specifically,
αi are composed of the part that is common and constant across varieties and the variety-
specific i.i.d. part, so that αi = α¯ + αs, s = {H,L}, and αs follows a two state Markov
process that is the same as the one in the main text. Since αs takes two different values
according to state s, we hereafter change the subscript from i to s.
The inverse demand for variety i is
pi = (αsφE)
1/σP (σ−1)/σq
−1/σ
i , (B.13)
where E is the total income and P is the aggregate price index such that
P =
(∫
i∈Ω
ασs p
1−σ
i di
)1/(1−σ)
. (B.14)
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Because a firm’s output is y = l/ϕ, the firm’s revenue can be expressed as
r(ϕ) = zsϕ
(1−σ)/σ l(σ−1)/σ , (B.15)
where l is the labor input in units of temporary workers, and zs ≡ (αsφE)
1/σP (σ−1)/σ . Note
that shocks on α are i.i.d. and the price index P is stable by the law of large numbers and
zs do not depend on firms’ productivity ϕ.
The wage for temporary workers is determined by the competitive wage in the numeraire
goods sector,and the wage for permanent workers is given by the wage for temporary workers
plus the constant efficiency premium as in the main text. The total employment in state
H is derived from the standard first-order condition:
λl1 + l2 =
(
zHη
w2
)σ
, (B.16)
where η ≡ (σ − 1)/σ · ϕ(1−σ)/σ .
Following the same procedure in the main text, the employment of permanent workers
is given by
λl1 =
(
zLη
ω1 − d
)σ
. (B.17)
The ratio of temporary workers to the total employment is given by
λl1
λl1 + l2
= 1−
(
zL
zH
·
w2
ω1 − d
)σ
= 1−
αH
αL
(
w2
ω1 − d
)σ
. (B.18)
Thus, the ratio of temporary workers under iso-elastic demand is constant and does not
depend on firm productivity ϕ. For CES demand, changes in the market size are reflected
in the price index P . However, the price index P is neutral with respect to the relative
demand for temporary workers.
B.4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
A firm’s optimal output in the high and low states is given by
qH(z¯, ϕ) =
L
2ζ
[z¯ + αH − ϕw2] and qL(z¯, ϕ) =
L
2ζ
[z¯ + αL − ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (B.19)
respectively, and where b = 2ζ/L and zj = z¯ + αs are used.
The profit maximizing prices ps, mark-ups µs defined by the difference between the price
and the marginal cost, and revenues rs are given by
pH(z¯, ϕ) =
1
2
(z¯ + αH + ϕw2) , pL(z¯, ϕ) =
1
2
[z¯ + αL + ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (B.20)
µH(z¯, ϕ) =
1
2
(z¯ + αH − ϕw2) , µL(z¯, ϕ) =
1
2
[z¯ + αL − ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (B.21)
rH(z¯, ϕ) =
L
4ζ
[
(z¯ + αH)
2 − (ϕw2)
2
]
, rL(z¯, ϕ) =
L
4ζ
[
(z¯ + αL)
2 − ϕ2 (ω1 − d)
2
]
. (B.22)
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As usual, productive firms have lower prices, higher mark-ups, and higher revenues than
unproductive firms in both states. In addition, prices, markups, and revenues are lower in
the low state than in the high state.
An operating firm’s profits in the low and high states are given by
πH(ϕ) = rH(ϕ)− w1l1(ϕ) −w2l2(ϕ)
=
1
2b
[
(zH)
2 − (ϕw2)
2
]
− w1l1 − w2
[
ϕ(zH − ϕw2)
b
− λl1
]
=
1
2b
[
(zH)
2 − (ϕw2)
2
]
+ (λw2 − w1)l1 −
ϕw2
b
(zH − ϕw2)
=
1
2b
(zH − ϕw2)
2 + ϕ (w2 − ω1) qL(ϕ), (B.23)
and
πL(ϕ) = rL(ϕ)− w1l1(ϕ)
=
1
2b
[
(zL)
2 − ϕ2 (ω1 − d)
2
]
− w1 ·
ϕ
λb
[zL − ϕ (ω1 − d)]
=
1
2b
[
(zL − ϕω1)
2 − (ϕd)2
]
. (B.24)
Solving equations (7) and (8) for Vj, we obtain
VH(ϕ) =
1
ρ(ρ+ β + γ)
[γπL(ϕ) + (ρ+ β)πH(ϕ)] (B.25)
VL(ϕ) =
1
ρ(ρ+ β + γ)
[(ρ+ β)πL(ϕ) + βπH(ϕ)]. (B.26)
Denoting the average profits prior to entry by π¯j =
∫ ϕj
0 πj(ϕ)dG(ϕ), the expected firm value
prior to entry is given by
V¯ = hV¯H + (1− h)V¯L =
hπ¯H + (1− h)π¯L
ρ
, (B.27)
where h ≡ β/(β + γ). Thus, the free entry condition is expressed by
hπ¯H + (1− h)π¯L = ρfe, (B.28)
which is interpreted as meaning that free entry depletes the return from investment of a
firm down to the level of the return from the safe asset.
It is evident that πs is increasing in z¯ and the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (B.28) is
monotonically increasing in z¯. Therefore, assuming that hπ¯H(0)+(1−h)π¯L(0) is sufficiently
small relative to ρfe, equation (B.28) uniquely determines a z¯ that satisfies ϕH(z¯) < ϕm.
With the Pareto distribution G(ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕm)
k, ϕ ∈ [0, ϕm], the average productivity of
operating firms in each state is given by
ϕ˜s(z¯) =
1
G(ϕs(z¯))
∫ ϕs(z¯)
0
ϕdG(ϕ) =
k
k + 1
ϕs(z¯), (B.29)
where ϕs(z¯) for s = {H,L} is the threshold productivity.
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Using equations (B.20), the average prices of operating firms in each state are given by
p˜s(z¯) =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
zs(z¯), s = {H,L}, (B.30)
which leads to an average price of operating firms such that
p˜(z¯) =
2k + 1
2(k + 1)
z¯. (B.31)
As z¯ ≡ (ηNp¯+ α¯ζ)/(ηN + ζ), the mass of firms is given by
N(z¯) =
2(k + 1)ζ(α¯− z¯)
ηz¯
, (B.32)
which is decreasing in z¯.
Letting NE denotes the mass of entrants, the mass of surviving firms N is given by
N = hNEG(ϕH ) + (1− h)NEG(ϕH )
G(ϕL)
G(ϕH )
. (B.33)
Hence, using the Pareto distribution, the mass of entrants is
NE =
N(ϕm)
k
h(ϕH (z¯))k + (1− h)(ϕL(z¯))k
. (B.34)
Applying the average productivity in equation (B.29) to the output in equation in (B.19),
the average output in each state is given by
q˜s(z¯) =
(z¯ + αs)L
2ζ(k + 1)
, for s = {H,L} (B.35)
Hence, the sector average of the ratio of temporary workers to total workers is given by
R˜WT (z¯) = 1−
ϕ˜Lq˜LG(ϕL)
ϕ˜H q˜HG(ϕH)
= 1−
(
w2
ω1 − d
)k+1( z¯ + αL
z¯ + αH
)k+2
, (B.36)
which is decreasing in z¯.
The average profits prior to entry in each state are given by
π¯H(z¯) =
L
[
(w2)
2(ϕH(z¯))
k+2 + k (w2 − ω1) (ω1 − d) (ϕL(z¯))
k+2
]
2ζ(k + 1)(k + 2)(ϕm)k
, (B.37)
and
π¯L(z¯) =
L (ω1 − d) [ω1 − (k + 1)d] (ϕL(z¯))
k+2
2ζ(k + 1)(k + 2)(ϕm)k
. (B.38)
Substituting equations (B.37) and (B.38) into (17), we obtain
A
(
z¯ + αH
w2
)k+2
+B
(
z¯ + αL
ω1 − d
)k+2
=
2ζ(k + 1)(k + 2)(ϕm)
kρfe
L
, (B.39)
where A ≡ h(w2)
2 and B ≡ (ω1 − d) [(1− h) [ω1 − (k + 1)d] + hk (w2 − ω1)]. Hence, as the
economy size increases (L ↑), the differentiated goods become more substitutable with each
other (ζ ↓), the productivity in the differentiated goods sector increases (ϕm ↓), or the entry
cost decreases (fe ↓), the average upper bound price z¯ will decrease.
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B.5 Open Economy Equilibrium
The optimized output, prices, mark-ups, revenues, and profits for exports are analogous to
those in the closed economy and given by
qXH =
L∗
2ζ
[z∗H − τ
∗ϕw2] , qXL =
L∗
2ζ
[z∗L − τ
∗ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (B.40)
pXH =
1
2
[z∗H + τ
∗ϕw2] , pXL =
1
2
[z∗L + τ
∗ϕ (ω1 − d)] , (B.41)
µXH =
1
2
[z∗H − τ
∗ϕw2] , µXL =
1
2
[z∗L − τ
∗ϕ (ω1 + d)] , (B.42)
and
rXH =
L∗
4ζ
[
(z∗H)
2 − (τ∗ϕw2)
2
]
, rXL =
L∗
4ζ
[
(z∗L)
2 − (τ∗ϕ(ω1 − d))
2
]
, (B.43)
respectively.
The export profits in the high state are given by
πXH(ϕ) =
L∗
4ζ
[z∗H − τ
∗ϕw2]
2 + I(ϕ) · τ∗ϕ (w2 − ω1) qXL(ϕ), (B.44)
where I(ϕ) is an indicator variable that takes 1 for ϕ ∈ [0, ϕXL) and 0 for ϕ ∈ [ϕXL, ϕXH ].
The export profits in the low state are given by
πXL(ϕ) =
L∗
4ζ
[
(z∗L − τ
∗ϕω1)
2 − (τ∗ϕd)2
]
. (B.45)
Holding other things constant, an increase in τ∗ lowers exports and raises the export price
in both states. However, the price increases are not sufficient to cover the declines of output,
and the revenues and profits decrease in both states:
∂πXH
∂τ∗
= −ϕ [w2qXH − (w2 − ω1) qXL]−
L∗
2ζ
τ∗ϕ (w2 − ω1) (ω1 − d) < 0,
∂πXL
∂τ∗
= −
L∗
2ζ
[
(zL − τ
∗ϕω1)ϕω1 + τ
∗(ϕd)2
]
< 0.
As home firms and foreign firms exporting to the home country face the same upper-
bound price in the home country, the price distributions of the home firms and foreign
exporters are the same. Thus, the average product prices p˜s(z¯) and the mass of operating
firms N take the same forms as the those in the closed economy (equations (B.30) and
(B.32)).
In the open economy setting, N consists of home firms and foreign firms exporting to
the home country. Denoting the mass of entrants in the home country by NE , the mass of
home firms ND is given by
ND = hNEG(ϕH ) + (1− h)NEG(ϕH)
G(ϕL)
G(ϕH )
= [hG(ϕH ) + (1− h)G(ϕL)]NE . (B.46)
Likewise, the mass of foreign firms exporting to the home country N∗X are obtained by
N∗X = [hG(ϕ
∗
XH ) + (1− h)G(ϕ
∗
XL)]N
∗
E (B.47)
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where N∗E denote the mass of entrants in the foreign country. We obtain NE and N
∗
E by
solving ND +N
∗
X = N and its counterpart equation in the foreign country simultaneously:
NE(z¯, z¯
∗) =
1
1− τ−k(τ∗)−k
[
(ϕm)
kN(z¯)
A(z¯)
−
τ−k(ϕ∗m)
kN∗(z¯∗)
A(z¯∗)
]
(B.48)
N∗E(z¯, z¯
∗) =
1
1− τ−k(τ∗)−k
[
(ϕ∗m)
kN∗(z¯∗)
A(z¯∗)
−
(τ∗)−k(ϕm)
kN(z¯)
A(z¯)
]
, (B.49)
where A(z¯) ≡ h(ϕH (z¯))
k + (1− h)(ϕL(z¯))
k. Therefore, the mass of home firms ND is
ND(z¯, z¯
∗) = A(z¯)(ϕm)
−kNE
=
1
1− τ−k(τ∗)−k
[
N(z¯)−
A(z¯)(ϕ∗m)
k
A(z¯∗)(ϕm)k
τ−kN∗(z¯∗)
]
, (B.50)
and the mass of foreign firms exporting to the home country is
N∗X(z¯, z¯
∗) = τ−kA(z¯)(ϕm)
−kN∗E =
τ−k
1− τ−k(τ∗)−k
[
A(z¯)(ϕ∗m)
k
A(z¯∗)(ϕm)k
N∗(z¯∗)− (τ∗)−kN(z¯)
]
.
(B.51)
Because ∂N/∂z¯ < 0 (∂N∗/∂z¯∗ < 0) and ∂A(z¯) ∂z¯ > 0 (∂A(z¯∗)/∂z¯∗ > 0),
∂NE
∂z¯
< 0,
∂NE
∂z¯∗
> 0 (B.52)
∂ND
∂z¯
< 0,
∂ND
∂z¯∗
> 0 (B.53)
∂N∗X
∂z¯
> 0,
∂N∗X
∂z¯∗
< 0. (B.54)
For example, suppose that L∗ increases. Then, while z¯∗ declines, z¯ is unaltered. There-
fore, in the home country, the mass of home firms decreases and the mass of foreign firms
exporting to the home country increases without changing the total mass of operating firms
in the home country, N .
As a special case, when the home and foreign countries are symmetric, ND and N
∗
X
become
ND =
2ζ(k + 1)
η [1 + τ−k]
[
(α¯− z¯)
z¯
]
=
N
1 + τ−k
(B.55)
N∗X =
2ζ(k + 1)τ−k
η [1 + τ−k]
[
(α¯− z¯)
z¯
]
=
τ−kN
1 + τ−k
. (B.56)
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